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Surge pricing is commonly used in on-demand ride-sourcing platforms (e.g., Uber, Lyft and Didi) to
dynamically balance demand and supply. However, since the price for ride service cannot be unlimited, there
is usually a reasonable or legitimate range of prices in practice. Such a constrained surge pricing strategy
fails to balance demand and supply in certain cases, e.g., even adopting the maximum allowed price cannot
reduce the demand to an affordable level during peak hours. In addition, the practice of surge pricing is
controversial and has stimulated long debate regarding its pros and cons. In this paper, to address the
limitation of current surge pricing practice, we propose a novel reward scheme integrated with surge pricing:
users can pay an additional amount on top of the regular surge price to a reward account during peak hours,
and then use the balance in the reward account to compensate for their trips during off-peak hours. The
integrated mechanism is valuable for both transportation and operations management research community.
It also proposes another important practical tool to balance demand and supply in ride-sourcing platforms.
Specifically, we build up an optimization model to determine number of travel requests in the platforms on
demand side of the market, an equilibrium model to characterize number of active drivers on supply side
of the market, and an optimization model on platforms decision to maximize platform profit. We compare
scenarios with and without reward scheme and explore them from three perspectives: user utility, driver
income, and platform revenue and profit. We find that, in some situations, all the three stakeholders, i.e.,
users, drivers, and the platform, will be better off under the reward scheme integrated with surge pricing.
It shows that the integrated reward scheme is a potentially powerful tool for the on-demand ride-sharing
market.
Key words : Ride-sourcing, Surge Pricing, Reward Scheme, User Utility, Driver Income, Platform Revenue
1. Introduction
Recent development and penetration of mobile internet technologies has enabled the introduction
of various innovative services under the sharing economy concept in our daily lives. Ride-sourcing
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transportation platforms such as Uber and Didi provide pioneering on-demand ride-sharing services
to users in the sharing economy context . Such platforms provide intermediary means for connecting
demand (e.g., users) and supply (e.g., drivers) in real time. These companies create mobile apps
for ride-sourcing which dispatch vehicles to serve users based on their real-time locations. Users
are informed of the coming vehicle information, estimated pick-up and arrival time, and estimated
fare. The platforms charge a particular fare per trip to users and pay certain wage to the drivers.
The difference between the fare and the wage is the commission withheld by the platform. The
commission is normally between 15% and 25%, depending on regions and companies. Such ride-
sourcing transportation platforms provide flexible working opportunities for private car owners
who are additional source of service providers that can satisfy on-demand travel requests.
The ride-sourcing sharing transportation platform provides a typical two-sided market. It is a
meeting place for two groups of agents (users and drivers) who interact and provide each other with
network benefits. Rochet and Tirole (2003) firstly pointed out the commonality across seemingly
different businesses/markets with a clear characterization of the two-sided market. In the shared
transportation context, users and drivers are sensitive to the prices and wages of the service, which
are critical decisions that the platform makes in coordinating and balancing demand and supply. It
leads to the introduction of the so-called “surge pricing” strategy, where the platform adjusts the
prices and wages dynamically based on real-time information of the demand and supply, taking
both social welfare (including user utility and driver income) and platform revenue and profit into
consideration. Surge pricing is very common, especially during demand peak hours, when Uber and
Didi usually increase prices/wages to reduce travel requests from users and attract more drivers.
However, surge pricing is controversial and has been questioned by service users, scholars, and
policy makers. The literature includes much debate on the potential harm of surge pricing on
the long term performance of sharing service platforms due to the strategic behavior of users,
e.g., Chen and Hu (2017) and Banerjee et al. (2015) showed that surge pricing underperforms
static pricing when the market environment is stable and the market size is large. In particular,
Chen and Hu (2017) showed that this result is true in the presence of forward-looking riders and
drivers. Additionally, in some extreme cases, the high prices determined by certain surge pricing
algorithms even created severe criticism to the platform. We refer the readers to the reports about
slam on Uber for its surge pricing after the terrorist attacks in Sydney1 and London2. In fact,
under pressure from the general public and regulators, and also considering the potential long term
impacts, platforms often adopt certain upper limits on the surge pricing. For example, Uber caps
1 https://newrepublic.com/article/120564/during-terrorist-attack-sydney-uber-imposing-surge-pricing
2 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4570020/Uber-slammed-price-surges-London-terror-attack.html
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its fares at a price that matches fourth highest price in a particular area over the preceding two
months3 during states of emergency in the U.S. However, from the perspective of meeting demand
with supply, any pre-determined range of price may result an imbalance between demand and
supply.
In this paper, we propose a novel reward scheme to reduce the potential negative impact of
surge pricing. Rewarding customers with the companies’ own products and services has become an
increasingly popular practice across a spectrum of industries, such as airlines, hotels, and telecom-
munication. To address the limitation of surge pricing, we propose an integrated reward scheme.
When a user takes a trip during demand peak hours (i.e., the period with high user travel utility,
hence high demand and surge price), on top of the surge price that is legitimate for the platform
to charge within a pre-determined range, the user can opt to pay a certain additional money for
priority dispatch of the service. This additional money does not go to the platform and drivers
directly, instead, it goes to the user’s so-called “reward account”. During demand off-peak hours
(e.g., the period with low user travel utility, hence low demand and normal price), the user can use
some of the balance in the reward account to compensate for his/her fare.
We explore the integrated reward scheme and surge price and find its benefits/advantages from
different perspectives:
• Prioritized Urgent Users and Increased Utility: The optional additional amount paid
by users during peak hours can indicate the travel urgency and thereby help users with urgent
needs to receive priority service. User utility may also increase in some cases.
• Increased Drivers Income: Users may take more trips during off-peak hours because of the
trip compensation, so the number of total realized trips and hence the total income of drivers
would increase.
• Increased Platform Revenue and Profit: The platform’s total revenue and profit may
increase due to more trips being realized during off-peak hours.
• Improved User Loyalty: Since users maintain a certain balance in the reward account, they
will have more incentive and hence loyalty in using the ride-sourcing services.
• Improved Public Image: Since the additional money paid by users during peak hours is
optional and does not go to the platform directly, it helps to reduce any criticism of the
platform on surcharges, hence improving its public image.
This study makes several contributions to the literature on balance supply and demand in the
ride-sourcing market: First, we explore, to our knowledge, the first study to leverage a reward
scheme with surge pricing in a shared transportation platform. We propose a model to describe the
3 http://time.com/3633469/uber-surge-pricing/
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behavior of users and drivers facing surge pricing integrated with a reward scheme. Second, we make
comparisons between scenarios with and without a reward scheme. We evaluate the performance
of the integrated mechanism in terms of social welfare and platform revenue/profit. Third, we
find that, using the reward scheme integrated with surge pricing, we can arrive at a win-win-win
situation for all the three stakeholders in the ride-sourcing business, namely users, drivers and the
platform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in Section 2, And
we formally present the model formulation and analysis in Section 3. In Section 4, comparisons
between performance with and without a reward scheme are conducted from the perspectives of
three stakeholders: users, drivers, and the platform. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Literature Review
The two-sided market has spawned a surge of interest and research in academia. Rochet and Tirole
(2003) provided a clear characterization of a two-sided market: by holding constant the sum of the
prices faced by two sides, any change in price structure (or price distribution) affects the volume of
transactions on the platform. They proposed a canonical model of two-sided markets with one plat-
form encompassing usage and membership externalities. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) determined
the equilibrium of two-sided market structures and characterized the efficiency properties. Arm-
strong (2006) proposed three models to illustrate platform competition in terms of pricing strategy
in two-sided markets. Diverse issues related to two-sided markets were reviewed and addressed by
Roson (2005), with various assumptions on timing, price instruments, and externalities.
Pricing and wage optimization of on-demand service, especially on-demand ride-sourcing trans-
portation service, has attracted much attention in recent years. For example, Bai et al. (2017)
presented a queuing model with endogenous supply (number of participating agents) and endoge-
nous demand (customer requests) to describe an on-demand service platform. They showed that
it is optimal for the platform to charge a higher price, pay a higher wage, and offer a higher com-
mission when potential customer demand increases. Bikhchandani and Sushil (2016) showed that
charging a fixed commission reduces intermediary profits and may also magnify a surge in buyer
prices and attenuate the surge in seller prices during high demand periods. Hu and Zhou (2017)
analyzed the price strategy of an on-demand platform under market uncertainty and found that
for a given realized market condition, the joint price and wage optimization can be reduced to a
one-dimensional problem of solving for the optimal matching quantity, and the optimal price has
a U-shaped relationship with the wage. Cachon et al. (2017) found that both users and drivers
benefit from surge pricing on a platform with self-scheduling capacity. Taylor (2017) examined the
impacts of delay sensitivity and agent independence on price and wage of the platform.
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There have also been some studies on reward schemes and loyalty programs. By introducing
loyalty programs in diverse formats, agents or retailers attract a huge number of regular members
who keep using their services, see Lal and Bell (2003), Caminal and Claici (2007), Singh et al.
(2008), Caminal (2012), Gandomi and Zolfaghari (2013). For example, Kim et al. (2001) and Kim
et al. (2004) investigated the design and adoption of loyalty and reward programs in the context of
capacity management and found that reward programs impose additional incentives for firms to set
higher prices. Yang and Tang (2018) proposed a new fare-reward scheme for railway transit aiming
to shift central peak period commuters to the shoulder peak period, which can reduce commuter
queuing time at stations without reducing transit operators revenue. In this study, we explore, to
our knowledge, for the first time, integrating a reward scheme with surge pricing in a ride-sourcing
market.
3. Models and Analysis
In this section, we propose models to describe the demand side, supply side, and the platform’s
decision making in a ride-sourcing market.
Demand Side of a Ride-sourcing Market
Assume that the total number of potential users (i.e., all the users of the ride-sourcing platform)
in a service district is N . Each individual user i, needs to travel during both off-peak and peak
hours, and can travel either using service on the ride-sourcing platform or by public transit (e.g.,
bus and metro service). We assume that all individuals are rational and make travel decisions with
the objective of maximizing their utilities from the trips. In this paper, we consider two types of
periods for the trips—off-peak hours and peak hours. Off-peak hours are defined as the periods
with relatively low travel utility to the users, hence normally have low demand. During off-peak
hours, by market regulation, platform can only set the trip fare at the basic fare and no surge
pricing is involved. Peak hours are defined as the periods with relatively high travel utility to the
users, hence normally have high demand. During peak hours, the platform can set the trip fare to
a higher level, known as the surge price.
We use pL and pH to denote the fare of each trip that the platform charges to users during off-
peak hours (with low user travel utility) and peak hours (with high user travel utility), respectively.
We use wL and wH to denote the wage of each trip that the platform pays to drivers during off-peak
and peak hours, respectively. We also assume that a trip by transit has a constant fare, pT , during
both off-peak and peak hours. Let nL, nH and nT denote a user’s decision on the number of trips
using the ride-sourcing platform during off-peak hours, the number of trips using the platform
during peak hours, and the total number of trips by transit, respectively. Table 1 in Appendix
provides a glossary of notation.
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In this paper, we ignore the difference in distance of each trip and assume that the utility of
travel for any user follows a specific Cobb−Douglas type of production function (see, e.g., Varian
(1992) and Yang and Yang (2011)). Then, the travel decisions of a representative user will be the
optimal solutions of the following constrained optimization problem:
max
ni
H
,ni
L
,ni
T
,si
M
U = (niH)
αH (niL)
αL(niT )
αT (siM)
αM (1)
s.t. pHn
i
H + pLn
i
L + pTn
i
T + s
i
M =B
i (2)
niH , n
i
L, n
i
T , s
i
M ≥ 0 (3)
αL, αH , αT denote the elasticity of utility with respect to trips using the platform during off-
peak hours and peak hours, and trips by transit, respectively. We assume αH > αL > αT , which
means that considering the urgency, time saving and comfort, trips using the platform during peak
hours have a higher utility compared to trips using the platform during off-peak hours, and trips
by transit contribute the least utility. We set α to 0 when the corresponding number of trips is 0,
e.g., we set αH = 0 when n
i
H = 0, which can be regarded as the corresponding trip mode not being
available. Bi is monetary limit that a user can afford to spend on travel in a decision period, e.g.,
in one week. Equation (2) represents a budget constraint and sM captures the money saved. αM in
the objective function denotes the elasticity of utility with respect to the saved money. We assume
Bi is a constant for a specific user.
The corresponding Lagrangian problem is:
L= (niH)
αH (niL)
αL(niT )
αT (siM)
αM −µ(pHniH + pLniL + pTniT + siM −Bi) (4)
The first order necessary conditions yield
αH(n
i
H)
αH−1(niL)
αL(niT )
αT (siM)
αM −µpH = 0
αL(n
i
H)
αH (niL)
αL−1(niT )
αT (siM)
αM −µpL = 0
αT (n
i
H)
αH (niL)
αL(niT )
αT−1(siM)
αM −µpT = 0
αM(n
i
H)
αH (niL)
αL(niT )
αT (siM)
αM−1−µ= 0
pHn
i
H + pLn
i
L + pTn
i
T + s
i
M −Bi = 0
(5)
We can now solve this problem as below:
niH =
αH
αH +αL +αT +αM
Bi
pH
niL =
αL
αH +αL +αT +αM
Bi
pL
niT =
αT
αH +αL +αT +αM
Bi
pT
siM =
αM
αH +αL +αT +αM
Bi
(6)
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Figure 1 Demand Curve During Peak and Off-peak Hours
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As introduced in Section 1, there is usually a pre-determined range of prices that is acceptable
or legitimate in practice. We assume that the range is [pmin, pmax] and the platform cannot set
fares beyond this range. Particularly, pmin is the basic fare during off-peak hours, and the platform
adopts a surge price strategy and can increase the fare up to pmax during peak hours.
We assume that each user has an individual total budget Bi, so the demand of trips on the
platform is NL =
∑N
i=1 n
i
L and NH =
∑N
i=1 n
i
H during off-peak hours and peak hours respectively.
The total demand for the public transit is NT =
∑N
i=1 n
i
T . Figure 1 illustrates the demand curve
of trips for the platform.
Supply Side of a Ride-sourcing Market
Let M be the total number of potential earning sensitive drivers who may decide to participate in
the platform, e.g., M is the number of registered drivers. We use wL and wH to denote the wage of
each trip that the platform pays to drivers during off-peak and peak hours, respectively and assume
they can not less than the minimum wage wmin determined by market. Let cL and cH denote the
operation cost of each vehicle during off-peak hours and peak hours, respectively. Let eL and eH
denote the earnings of drivers during the off-peak hours and the peak hours, respectively. Let mL
and mH denote the realized number of drivers participating in the platform during off-peak hours
and peak hours, respectively. We have mL ≤M and mH ≤M . If the number of realized trips is N rL
and N rH , then we have
eL =
wLN
r
L
mL
− cL (7)
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eH =
wHN
r
H
mH
− cH (8)
To model the earning-sensitivity of drivers, we assume that each potential driver has a reservation
earning q (i.e., corresponding to his/her outside option), where q varies across different drivers
(e.g., see Bai et al. (2017)). To model the heterogeneity among drivers, we assume that there is
a continuum of driver types so that the reservation earning q spreads over a range [qmin, qmax]
according to a cumulative distribution function F (.), where F (.) is a strictly increasing function
with F (qmin) = 0 and F (qmax) = 1.
For a driver with reservation earning q, he/she will participate to offer service only if his/her
earning eL and eH is at least equal to q during off-peak hours and peak hours, respectively. For
simplicity, if we assume F (.) is uniformly distributed, the probability of drivers participating in
the ride-sourcing platform during off-peak hours and peak hours are:
F (eL) =
eL− qmin
qmax− qmin (9)
F (eH) =
eH − qmin
qmax− qmin (10)
Hence, the total number of drivers participating in the platform are:
mL =MF (eL) =M
eL− qmin
qmax− qmin (11)
mH =MF (eH) =M
eH − qmin
qmax− qmin (12)
Let kL and kH denote the maximum number of trips that a driver/vehicle can serve during
off-peak and peak hours, respectively. We also have
mL ≥N rL/kL (13)
mH ≥N rH/kH (14)
Figure 2 illustrates the supply curve of trips for the platform during peak hours, which is quite
similar to the case during off-peak hours.
Market Assumptions
In this paper, we explore the integrated reward scheme with surge price. We expect that the reward
scheme will be particularly valuable if the relationship between supply and demand is very different
during off-peak and peak hours. In such case, manipulation of the surge price in a pre-determined
range will fail to balance the supply and demand.
Let NminH denote the minimum possible demand during peak hours and N
max
L denote the max-
imum possible demand during off-peak hours (see Figure 1). Let nH(p) and nL(p) denote the
functions nH and nL, depending on price p. Let m(w) denote the function of m depending on
wage w. We make following three assumptions on the supply and demand in the market to better
analyze the impacts of the reward scheme.
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Figure 2 Supply Curve During Peak Hours
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Assumption 1. Demand during peak hours is always higher than demand during off-peak hours
in the pre-determined range of prices. Specifically, we have
αH
pmax
≥ αL
pmin
, (15)
then
NminH =
αH
αH +αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i
pmax
≥NmaxL =
αL
αH +αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i
pmin
. (16)
Under Assumption 1, the demand during peak hours under the maximum legitimate priceNminH =∑N
i=1 n
i
H(pmax) is still higher than demand during off-peak hours under the basic minimum price
NmaxL =
∑N
i=1 n
i
L(pmin).
Assumption 2. The market has over demand during peak hours. Specifically, we have
kHM <
αH
αH +αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i
pmax
. (17)
All participating drivers are fully utilized during peak hours, so we have
kHmH =N
r
H . (18)
Under Assumption 2, during peak hours, even if we set the price to the maximum legitimate
value pmax to reduce demand, and set the driver’s wage to obtain the maximum earning qmax
to attract all the drivers, the demand is still more than the supply. In addition, all drivers who
participate to the platform are fully occupied during peak hours.
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Assumption 3. The platform profit increases with the increase of the number of participating
drivers during peak hours. Specifically, we have
pmax ≥ 2qmax + cH − qmin
kH
(αL +αT +αM)pmin
(αT +αM)pmin +αLwmin
. (19)
Assumption 4. The market has over supply during off-peak hours. Specifically, we have
αL
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− pmaxkHM
pmin
<
cL + qmax
wmin
M. (20)
Not all participating drivers are fully occupied during off-peak hours, so we have
wmin ≥ αL
αH +αL +αT +αM
(qmax− qmin)
∑N
i=1B
i
k2LMpmin
+
cL + qmin
kL
, (21)
then
mL(wmin)>
N∑
i=1
niL(pmin)/kL. (22)
Under Assumption 4, during off-peak hours, even if we set the price to the basic minimum price
pmin to attract more users, and a minimum wage guarantee wmin to reduce the supply, the supply
is still more than the demand.
The corresponding number of realized trips during peak and off-peak hours on the ride-sourcing
platform, and the number of realized trips by public transit can be formulated as follows:
Objective function(1)
s.t. Equations and Inequalities (2), (3) and (18)
By solving the corresponding Langrangian problems, we obtain the realized trips in each mode,
as below:
N rH = kHmH ;
N rL =
αL
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− pHkHmH
pL
;
N rT =
αT
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− pHkHmH
pT
.
(23)
Platform Decision Considering both the demand side and the supply side, the ride-sourcing
platform determines the price (pL, pH) and wage (wL, wH) during both off-peak and peak hours,
with the objective of maximizing its profit:
max
pH ,pL,wH ,wL
Pro= (pH −wH)N rH + (pL−wL)N rL (24)
s.t. (19),(23).
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Under Assumption 2, during peak hours, we need to set price p∗H = pmax to reduce the demand
as much as possible. Under Assumption 3, we set wage wH such that the earning eH will reach
qmax to attract all the drivers, i.e., eH = qmax and mH =M . Combining equations (8) and (14), we
can obtain the corresponding wage wH as follows:
w∗H =
qmax + cH
kH
. (25)
Hence, the realized trips in each mode yield:
N rH = kHM ;
N rL =
αL
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− pHkHM
pL
;
N rT =
αT
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− pHkHM
pT
.
(26)
Under Assumption 4, during off-peak hours, due to market regulation, the platform sets the price
to the basic price p∗L = pmin and hence N
r
L =N
max
L . To maximize the profit, we have w
∗
L = wmin.
Combining equations (7) and (11), we can obtain the corresponding mL and eL as follows:
mL =
√
M 2(cL + qmin)2 + 4MwminN rL(qmax− qmin)−M(cL + qmin)
2(qmax− qmin) , (27)
eL =
2(qmax− qmin)wminN rL√
M 2(cL + qmin)2 + 4MwminN rL(qmax− qmin)−M(cL + qmin)
− cL. (28)
Therefore, under the market assumptions, the platform sets the price as p∗H = pmax and p
∗
L = pmin,
and set the wage as w∗H =
qmax+cp
kp
and w∗L =wmin.
4. Comparisons of Scenarios with and without a Reward Scheme
In this section, we compare the scenarios with and without a reward scheme from three
perspectives— platform revenue and profit, driver income, and user utility.
We elaborate the details of reward scheme. As discussed in Assumption 2 in Section 3, demand
is still higher than supply during peak hours and hence some users cannot receive service even
if they are willing to pay the maximum legitimate price pmax. In such cases, for a user with real
urgent travel need or who simply does not want to wait, he/she can voluntarily choose to pay
an additional amount of money s to obtain service priority during peak hours. This additional
payment does not go to the platform directly, instead, it goes to the user’s reward account (which
can be easily checked on the mobile app). During off-peak hours, the user can use any balance in
his reward account to compensate for any trip made, e.g., using r dollars of the travel cost per trip.
Yang, Shao, Wang and Ye: Integrated Reward Scheme and Surge Pricing in a Ride-sourcing Market
12 Article submitted to ; manuscript no.
If we set the additional payment per trip s during peak hours and the compensation per trip r
during off-peak hours to satisfy following two constraints:
0≤ s≤ smax
s≥ V (r− pmin) +Z,
(29)
where smax =
αH
αH+αL+αT+αM
∑N
i=1B
i
kHM
− pmax, Z =
∑N
i=1B
i
kHM
− pmax, and V = cL+qmaxwminkH
αL+αT+αM
αL
, then
market assumptions 2, 3, and 4 with a reward scheme still hold. If r is set as r = pmin, then the
constraints can be written as s≥ Z and Z − V pmin < 0. Constraint (29) can also provide a range
of r≤ rmax where rmax = pmin− αLαH+αL+αT+αM
∑N
i=1B
i
M
wmin
cL+qmax
.
Depending on the values of s and r, we have the following two situations: (1) users have a
balance left in the reward account under their optimal number of trips in each mode, and (2)
users have used up the balance in the reward account. Next, we discuss the two situations.
Situation I: Users have Balance Left in the Reward Account
Let Y = αL
αL+αT+αM
r
pmin−r , on top of condition (29), if s and r furthur satisfy
max{ Y Z
Y + 1
, V (r− pmin) +Z} ≤ s≤ smax (30)
we have sN r
R
H ≥ rN r
R
L and sn
irR
H ≥ rnir
R
L for each user i. In such a case, users cannot use up their
balance in the reward account.
Then, given (30), we can obtain the realized number of trips under the reward scheme by solving
Objective function(1)
s.t. Equations and inequalities (2), (3), (18), (19) and (30)
Let pRH and p
R
L denote the price during peak and off-peak hours under the reward scheme.
Specifically, by replacing pH with p
R
H + s and pL with p
R
L − r in equation (26) as follows:
N r
R
H = kHM
N r
R
L =
αL
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− (pRH + s)kHM
pRL − r
N r
R
T =
αT
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− (pRH + s)kHM
pT
(31)
where the superscript R represents the number of trips under the reward scheme.
Users’ balance in the reward account can be taken as so-called “breakage” from the perspective
of accountancy4. In this paper, we investigate both the platform’s profit (denoted as Pro) and the
4 “Breakage” is a term used in accountancy to indicate any type of service which is unused by the customer; the
monetary value of breakage can be accounted as revenue or as a reduction of an expense, e.g., see Feinson (2008).
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revenue (i.e., profit + breakage, denoted as Rev) under the reward scheme.
Revenue: If we keep the price (p∗H and p
∗
L) and wage (w
∗
H and w
∗
L) the same as in the case without
a reward scheme, and set s and r to satisfy conditions (29) and (30), then the platform’s revenue
under reward scheme is:
RevR = (p∗H + s−w∗H)N r
R
H + (p
∗
L− r−w∗L)N r
R
L (32)
Compared with the case without a reward scheme, we have the change of revenue as:
RevR−Rev= sN rRH + (pmin−wmin− r)N r
R
L − (pmin−wmin)N rL (33)
Let X1 =
αT+αM
αL+αT+αM
pmin
wmin
+ αL
αL+αT+αM
, and if
s≥ Y Z
Y +X1
, (34)
the change of revenue (33) will be positive and the platform’s revenue will increase under a reward
scheme. In fact, since it is commonly to have that pmin/wmin ≥ 1, we have X1 ≥ 1. Therefore,
given (30), (34) will always be true, indicating that the platform’s revenue always increases when
users cannot use up their rewards and have a balance in their reward account.
Profit: If we keep price (p∗H and p
∗
L) and wage (w
∗
H and w
∗
L) as in the case without a reward
scheme, and set s and r to satisfy conditions (29) and (30), then the platform’s profit under a
reward scheme is:
ProR = (p∗H −w∗H)N r
R
H + (p
∗
L−w∗L)N r
R
L (35)
Compared with the case without a reward scheme, we have the change of profit as:
ProR−Pro= (pmin−wmin)(N rRL −N rL) (36)
Further, if
s≤ Z
pmin
r, (37)
the change of profit (36) will be positive and the platform’s profit will increase under reward
scheme.
Drivers Income: From (26) and (31), the total number of trips on the ride-sourcing platform
during peak hours remains unchanged under the reward scheme, i.e., N r
R
H =N
r
H . Under condition
(37), the total number of trips on the ride-sourcing platform during off-peak hours will increase
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under the reward scheme, i.e., N r
R
L >N
r
L. Since the wage paid to drivers remains unchanged and
deL/dN
r
L > 0, from (28), we find that drivers will be better off with a higher earning rate eL during
off-peak hours under the reward scheme.
Number of Users’ Trips: The total number of users’ trips (including trips on the ride-sourcing
platform and trips by transit, denoted as Trp) is the sum of N rH , N
r
L and N
r
T . Compared with the
case without a reward scheme, we have the change in the number of users’ trips as:
TrpR−Trp=N rRL +N r
R
T −N rL−N rT (38)
Let X2 =
αT
αL+αT+αM
pmin
pT
+ αL
αL+αT+αM
, and if
s≤ Y Z
Y +X2
, (39)
the change in the number of trips (38) will be positive and the number of trips will increase under
the reward scheme.
Combining (39) with (30), we find that when
pmin
pT
<
αT +αM
αT
, (40)
there is an intersection of conditions (30) and (39), i.e., there exists a value of s such that
Y Z
Y+1
≤ s≤ Y Z
Y+X2
.
User Utility: Compared with the case without a reward scheme, we have the change of user’s
utility (denoted as Uti) as:
UtiR−Uti= (nirRH )αH (nir
R
L )
αL(nir
R
T )
αT (sir
R
M )
αM − (nirH)αH (ni
r
L )
αL(ni
r
T )
αT (si
r
M)
αM (41)
To compare UtiR and Uti, we can also consider UtiR/Uti=
(nir
R
H )
αH (nir
R
L )
αL (nir
R
T )
αT (sir
R
M )
αM
(ni
r
H
)αH (ni
r
L
)αL (ni
r
T
)αT (si
r
M
)αM
. We
next show UtiR/Uti < 1.
We substitute (26) and (31) into UtiR/Uti < 1, giving (Z−s
Z
)αL+αT+αM ( pmin
pmin−r )
αL ≤ 1. Taking
logarithms, the inequality comes to
ln Z
Z−s
ln pmin
pmin−r
≥Q (42)
where Q= αL
αL+αT+αM
for simplicity.
The LHS of (42) is increasing with s, and s≥ Y Z
Y+1
under condition (30), thus
ln ZZ−s
ln
pmin
pmin−r
≥ ln(Y+1)
ln (YQ+1)
.
Since ln(Y+1)
ln (YQ+1)
is increasing with Y , and Y ≥ 0, then we have ln
Z
Z−s
ln
pmin
pmin−r
≥ limY=0 ln(Y+1)ln (YQ+1) =Q. There-
fore, (42) always holds and so does UtiR/Uti < 1. The change of utility (41) is always negative,
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which indicates that the user’s utility always decreases when user has a balance left in the reward
account.
We summarize the results for the situation in which users have a balance left in the reward
account in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Users have Balance Left). If max{ Y Z
Y+1
, V (r − pmin) + Z} ≤ s ≤ smax, users
cannot use up their reward and will have balance left in their reward account. Additionally,
(1) User’s utility always decreases.
(2) When pmin
pT
≥ αT+αM
αT
:
• If Z
pmin
r < s≤ smax, then the user makes fewer trips, the driver has a lower income, and the
platform has a higher revenue and lower profit (area (1) in Fig. 4(a),(c),(e)).
• If max{ Y Z
Y+1
, V (r − pmin) + Z} ≤ s ≤ min{ Zpmin r, smax}, then the user makes fewer trips, the
driver has a higher income, and the platform has a higher revenue and profit (area (2) in Fig.
4(a),(c),(e)).
(3) When pmin
pT
< αT+αM
αT
:
• If Z
pmin
r < s≤ smax, then the user makes fewer trips, the driver has a lower income, and the
platform has a higher revenue and lower profit (area (5) in Fig. 4(b),(d),(f)).
• If max{ Y Z
Y+X2
, V (r− pmin) +Z} ≤ s≤min{ Zpmin r, smax}, then the user makes fewer trips, the
driver has a higher income, and the platform has a higher revenue and profit (area (6) in Fig.
4(b),(d),(f)).
• If max{ Y Z
Y+1
, V (r− pmin) +Z} ≤ s <max{ Y ZY+X2 , V (r− pmin) +Z}, then the user makes more
trips, the driver has a higher income, and the platform has a higher revenue and profit (area
(7) in Fig. 4(b),(d),(f)).
Situation II: Users Use Up Reward
Assumption 5. Users will use the balance in the reward account, if any, to compensate for their
trips during off-peak hours.
Under Assumption 5, if s and r satisfy
max{0, V (r− pmin) +Z} ≤ s < Y Z
Y + 1
, (43)
Then, we have sN r
R
H < rN
rR
L and sn
irR
H < rn
irR
L for each individual user i. In such cases, users will
use up their balance in the reward account.
In situation II, some of the trips during off-peak hours are compensated while others are not.
Let nir
c
L and n
irn
L denote the number of realized trips of user i on the platform during off-peak
hours, with and without compensation, respectively. We have nir
R
L = n
irc
L +n
irn
L .
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During peak hours, the maximum number of trips for all users is
∑N
i=1 n
irR
H = kHM . Thus, the
number of realized trips with compensation during off-peak hours is nir
c
L = n
irR
H
s
r
as the balance
can be used up. Users then maximize their utility as follows:
max
nir
R
H
,nir
c
L
,nir
n
L
,nir
R
T
,sir
R
M
U = (nir
R
H )
αH (nir
c
L )
αL(nir
n
L )
αL(nir
R
T )
αT (sir
R
M )
αM (44)
s.t. (pRH + s)n
irR
H + (p
R
L − r)nir
c
L + p
R
Ln
irn
L + pTn
irR
T + s
irR
M =B
i (45)
N∑
i=1
nir
R
H = kHmH (46)
nir
c
L = n
irR
H
s
r
(47)
nir
R
H , n
irc
L , n
irn
L , n
irR
T , s
irR
M ≥ 0 (48)
Comparing objective function (44) with (1), we can interpret that there is an additional choice
for users in making decisions under the reward scheme. We can also simply add a corresponding
term (nicL)
0 in the objective function (1) to indicate that trips with compensation during off-peak
hours are not applicable when the reward scheme is not adopted.
By solving the associated Langrangian problem and combining with Assumption 3, we determine
the number of realized trips as follows:
N r
R
H = kHM
N r
c
L = kHM
s
r
N r
n
L =
αL
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− (pRH + srpRL)kHM
pRL
N r
R
T =
αT
αL +αT +αM
∑N
i=1B
i− (pRH + srpRL)kHM
pT
(49)
Revenue/Profit: In situation II, since users use up their reward balance (i.e., breakage is zero),
the revenue and the profit of the platform are identical. If we keep the price (p∗H and p
∗
L) and wage
(w∗H and w
∗
L) the same as in the case without reward scheme, and set s and r to satisfy conditions
(29) and (43), then the platform’s revenue and profit under the reward scheme is:
RevR = ProR = (p∗H + s−w∗H)N r
R
H + (p
∗
L− r−w∗L)N r
R
L (50)
Compared with the case without the reward scheme, we have the change of revenue/profit as:
RevR−Rev= ProR−Pro= (pmin−wmin)(N rcL +N r
n
L −N rL) (51)
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If (43) holds, the change of revenue (51) will be positive and the platform’s revenue and profit
will increase under the reward scheme.
Drivers Income:
From (26) and (49), the total number of trips on the ride-sourcing platform during peak hours
remains unchanged under the reward scheme, i.e., N r
R
H = N
r
H . Under condition (43), the total
number of trips on the ride-sourcing platform during off-peak hours will increase under the reward
scheme, i.e., N r
R
L >N
r
L. Since the wage paid to drivers remains unchanged and deL/dN
r
L > 0 from
(28), we find that drivers will be better off with a higher earning rate eL during off-peak hours
under the reward scheme.
Number of Users’ Trips: Compared with the case without a reward scheme, we have the change
of the total number of users’ trips as:
TrpR−Trp=N rcL +N r
n
L +N
rR
T −N rL−N rT (52)
When
pmin
pT
≤ αT +αM
αT
, (53)
the change (52) will be positive and the total number of trips will increase under the reward
scheme.
User Utility: Compared with the case without the reward scheme, we have the change of
user’s utility as:
UtiR−Uti= (nirRH )αH (nir
c
L )
αL(nir
n
L )
αL(nir
R
T )
αT (sir
R
M )
αM − (nirH)αH (ni
r
L )
αL(ni
r
T )
αT (si
r
M)
αM (54)
The change of utility will be positive when
Q ln(kHM
s
r
)− ln Z
Z − s
r
pmin
≥ 0, (55)
where Q= αL
αL+αT+αM
.
When s
r
= 0, the LHS of (55) is negative.
Further, when
s
r
≤ Q
Q+ 1
Z
pmin
, (56)
the LHS of (55) increases with s
r
.
The maximum value of s
r
is obtained at the intersection point of the upper bound and lower
bound in (43), which is (s, r) = (Q(V pmin−Z)
1−Q ,
V pmin−Z
V (1−Q) ). At this point,
s
r
=QV . Combining (20) in
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assumption 4, we have QV > Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
, which means the LHS of (55) increases in (0, Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
) and
decreases in ( Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
,QV ).
When s
r
= Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
, the LHS of (55) reaches the maximum value of Q ln( Q
Q+1
kHMZ
pmin
)− ln (Q+ 1),
which is greater than 0 when
ln(
kHMZ
pmin
)≥ Q+ 1
Q
ln (Q+ 1)− lnQ. (57)
When s
r
=QV , the LHS of (55) reaches a value of Q ln (QkHMV )− ln ZZ−QV pmin , which is greater
than 0 when
ln(kHMV )≥− ln (1−Q)
Q
− lnQ. (58)
Therefore, as shown in Figure 3, when ln(kHMZ
pmin
)< Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1)− lnQ, the LHS of (55) is always
negative and user’s utility always decreases (see Figure 3(a)); when ln(kHMZ
pmin
)≥ Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1)− lnQ
and ln(kHMV )<− ln (1−Q)Q − lnQ, the LHS of (55) is negative when sr = 0 and sr =QV and positive
when s
r
= Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
, so there is an interval of s
r
denoted as (B1,B2) in which user’s utility increases
(see Figure 3(b)); when ln(kHMV )≥− ln (1−Q)Q − lnQ, the LHS of (55) is negative when sr = 0 and
positive when s
r
= Q
Q+1
Z
pmin
and s
r
=QV , so there is an interval of s
r
denoted as (B1,QV ) in which
user’s utility increases (see Figure 3(c)).
We summarize the results for the situation in which users use up reward in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Users Use Up Reward). If max{0, V (r − pmin) + Z} ≤ s < max{ Y ZY+1 , V (r −
pmin) +Z}, users will exhaust their reward and will have zero balance left in their reward account.
Additionally,
(1) Driver has higher income.
(2) Platform has higher revenue and profit.
(3) When pmin
pT
≥ αT+αM
αT
: user makes fewer trips (area (3) in Fig. 4(a),(c),(e) and area (4) in
Fig. 4(c),(e)).
(4) When pmin
pT
< αT+αM
αT
: user makes more trips (area (8) in Fig. 4(b),(d),(f) and area (9) in
Fig. 4(d),(f)).
(5) When ln(kHMZ
pmin
) < Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1)− lnQ: user’s utility decreases (area (3) in Fig. 4(a) and
area (8) in Fig. 4(b)).
(6) When pmin/pT ≥ (αT +αM)/αT , ln(kHMZpmin ) ≥
Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1) − lnQ, and ln(kHMV ) <
− ln (1−Q)
Q
− lnQ: user’s utility decreases in area (3) in Fig. 4(c) and area (8) in Fig. 4(d); user’s
utility increases in area (4) in Fig. 4(c) and area (9) in Fig. 4(d).
(7) When pmin/pT < (αT +αM)/αT and ln(kHMV )≥− ln (1−Q)Q − lnQ: user’s utility decreases in
area (3) in Fig. 4(e) and area (8) in Fig. 4(f); user’s utility increases in area (4) in Fig. 4(e) and
area (9) in Fig. 4(f).
Yang, Shao, Wang and Ye: Integrated Reward Scheme and Surge Pricing in a Ride-sourcing Market
Article submitted to ; manuscript no. 19
Figure 3 Curves of LHS of (55) Q ln(kHM
s
r
)− ln Z
Z− s
r
pmin
with Respect to s
r
s/r
0
min
ln lnH
s Z
Q k M
sr
Z p
r
 
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 

QV
min1
Q Z
Q p
(a) When ln( kHMZ
pmin
)< Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1)− lnQ
min
ln lnH
s Z
Q k M
sr
Z p
r
 
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 

QV
min1
Q Z
Q p s/r1
B 2B
0
(b) When ln( kHMZ
pmin
) ≥ Q+1
Q
ln (Q+ 1) − lnQ and
ln(kHMV )<− ln (1−Q)Q − lnQ
min
ln lnH
s Z
Q k M
sr
Z p
r
 
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 

QV
min1
Q Z
Q p s/r1B
0
(c) When ln(kHMV )≥− ln (1−Q)Q − lnQ
Combining situation I and situation II described above, we illustrate the impacts of the reward
scheme in Figure 4. Figure 4(a),(c),(e) shows the case when pmin/pT ≥ (αT +αM)/αT and Figure
4(b),(d),(f) shows the case when pmin/pT < (αT +αM)/αT .
The black bold lines represent the boundary given in (29), which guarantee the market assump-
tions 2 and 4 under the reward scheme.
The red curve represents the boundary given in (30) and (43) that indicates whether users will
use up the balance in the reward account: the area above the red curve is the domain of s and r
in which users cannot use up their reward and thus have a balance left in the reward account, and
vice versa.
The green line is the boundary given in (37) to indicate the change of both the driver’s income
and the platform’s profit: the area below the green line is the domain of s and r in which both
driver’s income and platform’s profit increase under reward scheme, and vice versa. The platform’s
revenue always increases under the reward scheme in the entire region, which is the area within
the black bold lines.
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The blue curve is the boundary given in (39) that indicates the change in the total number
of trips that the user makes: the area below the blue curve is the domain of s and r in which
user makes totally more trips under the reward scheme, and vice versa. It depends on pmin and
pT : When pmin/pT ≥ (αT +αM)/αT as in Figure 4(a), number of trips always decrease; when
pmin/pT < (αT +αM)/αT as in Figure 4(b), number of trips increases, as below the blue curve.
The purple lines are the boundaries given in (55) to indicate the change of the user’s utility: the
area above (or between) the purple line(s) is the domain of s and r in which user’s utility increases
under the reward scheme.
Particularly, the shadow area (area (4) and area (9)) demonstrates the domain of s and r gener-
ating a win-win-win case for all the three stakeholders—users with more utility, drivers with higher
income, and the platform with higher revenue and profit. In area (9), the total number of trips
also increases.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an innovative mechanism with an integrated reward scheme and surge
pricing for a ride-sourcing market. Currently, platforms use surge pricing to balance demand and
supply. However, since the price for ride service cannot be unlimited, usually there is a reasonable
or legitimate range of prices in practice. Such constrained surge pricing strategy does, however, fail
to balance demand and supply in some cases.
We propose a novel reward scheme integrated with surge pricing: users can pay an additional
amount on top of the regular surge price to a reward account during peak hours, and then use the
balance in the reward account to compensate for their trips during off-peak hours. This reward
scheme can be more acceptable to the public since the additional money paid by users during peak
hours does not go to the platform directly.
We propose a model to describe the behavior of users and drivers facing surge pricing integrated
with a reward scheme. We then compare the scenarios with and without the reward scheme from
three perspectives: user’s utility, driver income, and platform revenue and profit. We find that, in
some cases, all the three stakeholders, i.e., users, drivers, and the platform, will be better off under
the integrated reward scheme with surge pricing.
There are some avenues for future work. One is to consider the additional money s that users pay
during peak hours and the compensation r that users employ during off-peak hours as platform’s
or users’ decision variables, which may further improve the benefits of the reward scheme. Another
area is to numerically estimate and calibrate parameters in the model using real data from a
ride-sourcing company, and implement this novel reward scheme in practice.
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Figure 4 Comparisons between Cases with and without Reward Scheme
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Parameters Definitions
N Total number of users
αH , αL, αT , αM Elasticity of utility with respect to the corresponding variables
pT Trip fare by transit
Bi Total money budget of user i
pmax, pmin Maximum/minimum trip fare that the platform can set
M Total number of drivers
qmax, qmin Maximum/minimum reservation earning rate of drivers
cH , cL Operation cost of drivers during peak/off-peak hours
kH , kL Maximum number of trips that a driver/vehicle can serve during
peak/off-peak hours
wmin Minimum wage that the platform can set
s Additional money per trip paid to the reward account during peak
hours
r Compensation per trip using reward balance during off-peak hours
Users Decisions
niH , n
i
L, n
i
T Number of trips on platform during peak/off-peak hours and by
transit, user i
niH
r, niL
r, niT
r Number of trips users realized in each mode without reward scheme,
user i
nir
R
H , n
irR
L , n
irR
T Number of trips users realized in each mode with reward scheme, user i
nir
c
L Number of realized trips with fare compensation during off-peak
hours, user i
nir
n
L Number of realized trips without fare compensation during off-peak
hours, user i
siM Saved money, user i
siM
r, sir
R
M Realized saved money without/with reward scheme, user i
Platform Decisions
pH , pL Trip fare during peak/off-peak hours without reward scheme
wH ,wL Wage to drivers during peak/off-peak hours without reward scheme
pRH , p
R
L Trip fare during peak/off-peak hours with reward scheme
wRH ,w
R
L Wage to drivers during peak/off-peak hours with reward scheme
p∗H , p
∗
L,w
∗
H ,w
∗
L Optimal decisions of platform without reward scheme
Intermediate Variables
NminH ,N
max
L Minimum/maximum possible number of trips during peak/off-peak
hours
mH ,mL Number of participating drivers during peak/off-peak hours
eH , eL Drivers earning rate during peak/off-peak hours
Rev,RevR Platform revenue without/with reward scheme
Pro,ProR Platform profit without/with reward scheme
Trp,TrpR Total number of trips users make without/with reward scheme
Uti,UtiR User utility of a representative user
Table 1 Summary of Major Notation.
Appendix
